1. Consider a 2-player zero-sum game with a payoff matrix A that satisfies A T = −A. Prove that this game has minimax value zero, and that every minmaximizer for Player 1 is also a maxminimizer for Player 2.
2. Consider the following 2-Player game. Each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses a number j i ∈ {0, . . . , 100}. The payoff is defined as follows: If
Describe all pure Nash Equilibria of this game. Find at least one mixed Nash Equilibrium of this game.
3. Find all Nash equilibria of the following 2-Player game in extensive form. First, Player 1 chooses a number k ∈ {0, . . . , 100}. Then Player 2 chooses a number b ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
The payoff of Player 1 is 100 − k + 3b. The payoff of Player 2 is k − b.
Imagine that you are playing the game as Player 1 or Player 2, respectively. What would be your strategy?
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